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Abstract
This SHEA white paper identifies knowledge gaps and challenges in healthcare epidemiology research related to coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) with a focus on core principles of healthcare epidemiology. These gaps, revealed during the worst phases of the COVID-19
pandemic, are described in 10 sections: epidemiology, outbreak investigation, surveillance, isolation precaution practices, personal protective
equipment (PPE), environmental contamination and disinfection, drug and supply shortages, antimicrobial stewardship, healthcare personnel
(HCP) occupational safety, and return to work policies. Each section highlights three critical healthcare epidemiology research questions with
detailed description provided in supplementary materials. This research agenda calls for translational studies from laboratory-based basic
science research to well-designed, large-scale studies and health outcomes research. Research gaps and challenges related to nursing homes
and social disparities are included. Collaborations across various disciplines, expertise and across diverse geographic locations will be critical.
(Received 7 January 2021; accepted 7 January 2021; electronically published 25 January 2021)

The emergence and rapid worldwide spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has led to substantial social and economic disruption and loss of life. Throughout the
pandemic, healthcare providers, hospitals, and health systems have
worked tirelessly to provide safe care for patients while simultaneously ensuring safety for frontline providers. Early efforts to prevent transmission relied on prepandemic evidence and rapidly
emerging novel data. Through the first 9 months of the pandemic,
>60,000 articles were published on SARS-CoV-2 and coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19), not including the now ubiquitous preprints.1 As a result, the scientific community already has learned a
great deal about COVID-19, leading to evolving guidelines for
treatment, testing, and prevention.2–5 Despite considerable progress,
the community still has much to learn.
As the adage goes, “The more you know, the more you realize
how much you don’t know.” This SHEA white paper identifies
remaining knowledge gaps and challenges in healthcare epidemiology research related to COVID-19. These gaps are described in
10 sections : epidemiology, outbreak investigation, surveillance,
isolation precaution practices, personal protective equipment
(PPE), environmental contamination and disinfection, drug and
supply shortages, antimicrobial stewardship, healthcare personnel
(HCP) occupational safety, and return to work policies (Table 1;
Supplementary Tables 1–4 online). Each section highlights 3 critical healthcare epidemiology research questions, while many other
important research questions are provided in supplementary
tables, including a table highlighting the subset of questions particularly relevant to children (Supplementary Table 5 online).
Research gaps and challenges related to nursing homes and social
disparities are included.
1. Epidemiology
Understanding the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 is critical to
minimizing the burden of the COVID-19 pandemic in healthcare
settings. Epidemiologic research on individual as well as populationlevel transmission dynamics, risk factors for virus acquisition, and
predictors of severe disease outcomes can inform healthcare capacity
planning, clinical care, and infection prevention practices within
healthcare settings. Three research domains identified below
(Supplementary Table 1 online) represent priority areas with unanswered questions in the epidemiology of disease relevant to healthcare and infection prevention:

Priority area 1: Understand heterogeneity in epidemiology and
transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2.
Priority area 2: Define characteristics and impact of asymptomatic/
pre-symptomatic patients infected with SARS-CoV-2.
Priority area 3: Characterize risk factors that lead to severe disease
outcomes including age, sex, and race, with special emphasis on
health disparities, socio-economic status, and comorbidities.
The heterogeneity in COVID-19 transmission dynamics is typified by both strain differences and “superspreading events” in
which a small number of individuals account for a large fraction
of transmission. Recent reports of variant strains being associated
with an increased facility for spread as well as higher viral burdens
in infected individuals require further explanation. Identifying the
causes of superspreading in healthcare settings is key, especially in
various settings that house high-risk populations such as in nursing homes and other long-term care facilities.6–8 Also critical is an
enhanced understanding of viral transmission patterns through
the air (in more depth than simply droplet versus airborne transmission) that can support evidence-based PPE, physical distancing, and ventilation policies, which currently vary across
healthcare settings.6 With continued shortages in PPE, identifying
the relative risk of occupational versus community exposures in
HCP is essential to identify failures in occupational safety and
implement comprehensive interventions to safeguard HCP.
One unique epidemiologic feature of COVID-19 is the sheer
number of asymptomatic or presymptomatic cases reported, which
has ranged from 1% to >50% and has resulted in widespread
increases in SARS-CoV-2 testing.6,9–15 Several studies have documented high viral loads in asymptomatic individuals, which suggests that they could be significant contributors to transmission
and that symptom screening alone cannot contain transmission.9,16
This issue highlights the need for studies in children, who have lower
rates of illness and hospitalization and gather in school and daycare
settings (Supplementary Table 5 online).17 An understanding of the
role of asymptomatic or presymptomatic individuals in transmission will influence societal considerations regarding opening
schools, resuming economic activities such as opening gyms, and
allowing social events such as having small and large gatherings.
Finally, studying the epidemiology of severe and post-acute
disease can inform patient and HCP safety protocols, clinical practice guidelines, vaccine recommendations, and concurrent
management of other chronic conditions. To date, the burden of
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Table 1. COVID-19 Healthcare Epidemiology Research Priorities
Section

Research Priority Areas

Detailed Research Questions

Heterogeneity in transmission dynamics

Supplementary Table 1

Adult populations
Epidemiology

Role of asymptomatic/presymptomatic transmission
Risk factors for severe disease outcomes
Outbreak investigation

Outbreak cessation
Personnel and skill set
Resources and tools

Surveillance

Detection strategies
Population-level transmission risks
Population surveillance

Isolation precaution practices

Initiation of precautions

Supplementary Table 2

Management
Discontinuation
Personal protective equipment (PPE)

Determination of appropriate PPE
Strategies to improve PPE
Impact on other viruses

Environmental disinfection

Risks related to environmental contamination
Strategies for evaluating environmental contamination
Disinfection strategies

Shortages

Impact of shortages

Supplementary Table 3

Dissemination of best practices
Clinical consequences
Antimicrobial stewardship

Healthcare utilization
Coinfection
Effective stewardship strategies

Occupational safety

HCP exposure

Supplementary Table 4

HCP mental health
Social/Organizational barriers and facilitators
Return to work policies

Risk in returning HCP
Optimal criteria for return to work
Sociocultural impact

Pediatric populations

Risk of disease transmission

Supplementary Table 5

Estimate and mitigate transmission in schools
Long-term sequelae of symptomatic/asymptomatic disease
Risk factors for and long-term sequelae of MIS-C?
Develop of effective screening algorithms to initiate isolation
Significance of fecal shedding and environmental contamination
Impact of COVID-19 on antibiotic prescribing?
Note. HCP, healthcare personnel; PPE, personal protective equipment; MIS-C, multisystem inflammatory syndrome in children (MIS-C).

SARS-CoV-2 infection has had a disproportionate impact on racial
and ethnic minority communities, frontline workers, and individuals with underlying conditions, such as diabetes, hypertension,
obesity, and heart, lung, or kidney disease.7,18–21 Prioritizing research
on the underlying societal and biological risk factors and optimal
prevention and treatment for these high-risk groups is important.
Furthermore, the extent and burden of long-term cardio-metabolic,
respiratory, neurological, and psychological sequelae, including

among asymptomatic individuals or those with mild disease,
requires further study.8,22,23
2. Outbreak investigation
COVID-19 poses a unique challenge in outbreak investigation
stemming from its novelty coupled with the rapid worldwide
spread into all sectors of society, including into diverse healthcare
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settings in which patients, staff, and visitors can be the source of
infection. As a result of asymptomatic transmission of uncertain
route, COVID-19 requires a broad new approach to outbreak mitigation within healthcare settings, building upon the traditional
public health methodologies. Many important potential avenues
of research have opened in pursuit of this aim.24 Three research
domains identified below (Supplementary Table 1 online) represent priority areas with unanswered questions about optimal
COVID-19 outbreak investigations relevant to hospitals, nursing
homes, and rehabilitation hospitals:
Priority area 1: Identify critical interventions required to stop
COVID-19 outbreaks.
Priority area 2: Determine optimal personnel, expertise, and training required to conduct rapid SARS-CoV-2 and other outbreak
investigations.
Priority area 3: Identify optimal resources and technology (reporting tools, software and hardware) to support outbreak
investigations.
Several studies have highlighted the need for adequate resources, infrastructure, and personnel with expertise and leadership
support to conduct timely, evidence-based infection prevention
activities, including outbreak investigations.25–28 HCP that work
in overtaxed health care systems, faced with a rapidly spreading
outbreak, as well as confusing and changing guidance, are at an
elevated risk for burnout and moral distress.29 These challenges
to conducting rapid and effective outbreak investigations are further amplified in nursing homes and small to mid-sized hospitals.30
Compared to larger hospitals, smaller hospitals face unique challenges, including infection preventionists (IPs) with other non–
infection-related responsibilities, lack of specific IP training, lack
of data synthesis and reporting tools, and high personnel turnover.28,31–33 For example, rapid reporting systems can provide
benchmarks to improve early outbreak detection in hospitals,
nursing homes, and other healthcare settings leading to early interventions to curtail the outbreak.34 Technical knowhow and expertise in conducting outbreak investigations are important to identify
key characteristics of the outbreak, including: populations being
most affected; unique presentations that could vary by age, gender,
race, comorbidities, or frailty; and patterns of transmission. Such
expertise should also provide institutions with rapid, simple, systemic and culturally appropriate interventions.
3. Surveillance strategies
Robust surveillance of COVID-19 is critical to designing effective
strategies for timely identification of COVID-19, limiting the spread
of disease, and informing public health priorities and responses. Three
research domains identified below (Supplementary Table 1 online) represent priority areas with unanswered questions in surveillance strategies relevant to healthcare and infection prevention:
Priority area 1: Determine optimal and rapid surveillance strategies
to accurately define the scale and depth of COVID-19 and its
impact on populations, communities, and individuals.
Priority area 2: Determine and evaluate high-yield, cost-effective,
and efficient testing-based population surveillance strategies.
Priority area 3: Identify highest risk populations for targeted interventions based on their age, gender, race, comorbidities, settings, and community spread.

159

Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
tests for SARS-CoV-2 can remain positive up to 3 months and
do not directly translate to transmissibility. Viable virus has often
not been found beyond 10 days in immunocompetent hosts,
barring some instances.35–40 As a result, use of RT-PCR results
for surveillance would overestimate COVID-19 incidence and
prevalence, leading to misclassification of community-level burden. Large-scale longitudinal surveillance studies are needed to
evaluate duration of test positivity (ie, RT-PCR, antigen, and serology) and risk for COVID-19 reinfection, with subgroup evaluation
by symptoms (eg, asymptomatic, mild-to-moderate symptoms,
and hospitalized patients).39,40
Although manufacturers report high sensitivity and specificity
against assay controls, clinical sensitivity and specificity for
COVID-19 infection is relatively unknown. In some instances, sensitivity has been reported to be as low as 70%, depending on the
quality of the specimen obtained and the time at which the sample
is taken during a patient’s illness.41,42 Studies are needed to evaluate
the clinical performance characteristics of COVID-19 testing tools
against the sensitivity and specificity of full-symptom screening,
including early indicators of infection. Results from these studies
will inform optimal sentinel surveillance strategies for large populations through en masse testing, such as pooled saliva sample
testing or sewer line sampling.
Large-scale surveillance data within a wide variety of community and work settings and activities can lead to identification of
groups and locations associated with high risk for transmission,
leading to improved strategies for prevention and PPE use.
Specific attention is needed within healthcare settings including
nursing homes; assisted living facilities; group homes; factories
and food processing plants; jails and prisons; and places of education such as schools, colleges, and universities. Supplementary
Table 5 (online) highlights additional considerations relevant to
pediatric surveillance, including surveillance for the multisystem
inflammatory syndrome in children (MIS-C). Exposure risks
may be further defined through novel surveillance tools (eg, personal exposure monitors and tracking apps).
4. Isolation precaution practices
Standard and transmission-based precaution practices are cornerstones of preventing transmission of infectious pathogens and
ensuring HCP and patient safety across all healthcare settings.43
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) developed
and updated interim infection prevention and control recommendations regarding the use of transmission-based isolation precautions
when caring for patients with suspected or confirmed SARS-CoV-2
infection in healthcare facilities.44 This guidance focuses on HCP
and patient screening, testing protocols, patient placement and management practices, use of PPE, and family/visitor interactions.
However, as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to unfold, so
does the need for a more rigorous evidence base to inform isolation
practices and to assist healthcare facilities with effectively implementing public health guidance. Three research domains identified
here (Supplementary Table 2 online) represent priority areas with
unanswered questions in isolation precautions relevant to healthcare and infection prevention:
Priority area 1: Determine when and how to initiate transmissionbased isolation precautions for COVID-19.
Priority area 2: Determine how to optimize management and care
delivery while isolation precautions are in place.
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Priority area 3: Determine when to discontinue COVID-19 isolation precautions and reinstitute isolation in cases of possible reinfection.
COVID-19 has a wide variety of clinical presentations ranging
from asymptomatic to severely ill.45 Healthcare facilities use various criteria based on individual signs and symptoms to determine
when to test individuals for COVID-19 and initiate isolation precautions while awaiting results, and they use various testing protocols to detect asymptomatic and presymptomatic individuals.
Although these are critical strategies for stopping COVID-19
transmission, questions remain about the effectiveness of various
screening and testing protocols to initiate isolation precautions
practices and reduce transmission risk.
Once in isolation, use of PPE (ie, gloves, gown, mask, N95
respirator or power air-purifying respirator [PAPR], eye protection) for known or suspected COVID-19 patients can pose
challenges to the delivery of care and can potentially delay recognition of other healthcare-associated conditions.46 Furthermore,
COVID-19 isolation can be problematic for hospitalized patients
and nursing home residents due to the use of equipment that
can inhibit visual and auditory cues and visitor restrictions resulting in less family contact and support. The inability to connect with
family members is one of the most distressing consequences of
COVID-19 isolation, with a potential for long-lasting psychological
consequences in survivors.47,48 Research to better understand, identify, and test approaches to mitigate the psychological, physical, and
care delivery challenges related to COVID-19 isolation precaution
practices, including the benefits and unintended consequences
of family and visitor policies and restrictions, are needed.46–49
Recommendations for discontinuing isolation have been based
on symptoms, test results, and time from positive test.37,50,51
Discontinuation of isolation precautions allows individuals to
engage in normal and/or recovery-focused activities. To do so
safely, however, discontinuation policies must also take into
account the risk of secondary transmission. In other words, balancing risk of transmission events if isolation is discontinued too early
against the risks of staying in isolation too long. Thus, research on
when and how to safely discontinue isolation that balances public
health and patient priorities is needed. Improved understanding of
how continued positive test results correlate with transmission will
also help guide isolation discontinuation policies.52
These research questions and resultant policy implications
impact HCP directly. Early studies suggest that interventions, such
as a triage committee and team decision making, may decrease the
perception of personal culpability for untoward patient outcomes.29 Thus, meaningfully enhancing HCP engagement in
developing research questions and in decision-making processes
are critical to reducing moral distress and burnout.
5. Personal protective equipment (PPE)
General recommendations for HCP use of PPE are available from
the CDC; expert groups have provided additional recommendations
for use of PPE in crisis scenarios.5,44 Both CDC and expert guidance
has been largely based on limited data extrapolated from other viral
infections (eg, influenza, SARS-CoV-1) and/or studies with significant biases limiting generalizability. Research domains identified
below (Supplementary Table 2 online) represent priority areas with
unanswered questions concerning PPE use in healthcare settings:
Priority area 1: What is the appropriate level of universal PPE for
current pandemic and afterward?
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Priority area 2: What are the sociobehavioral, adaptive, and contextual factors required to improve appropriate PPE use?
Priority area 3: Are PPE interventions made during the COVID-19
pandemic likely to be effective against other commonly circulating respiratory viruses?
COVID-19 is generally thought to spread primarily through
respiratory droplets; thus, the current role of PPE is aimed at
decreasing droplet transmission. Masks are used as the cornerstone of source control (symptomatic or asymptomatic person
with COVID-19).53 However, it is possible that COVID-19 transmission can occur through the eyes, either by direct droplet inoculation or via autoinoculation. In this setting, eye protection (face
shields or goggles) has also been recommended and may play a
key role in infection prevention. In a 2014 study that utilized a
cough simulator and breathing worker simulator to model droplet transmission, face shields prevented exposure to droplets;
however, masks were not used.54 A meta-analysis indicated that
physical distancing, masks, and eye protection decreased the
odds of COVID-19 transmission; however, the relative risk
reduction of eye protection plus a face mask for COVID-19
has not been well described.55 Additionally, the benefit of face
shields alone in source control of an asymptomatic or presymptomatic patient is not known.
Research on compliance with PPE guidance in prior outbreaks
has focused on methods of delivering training.56 In the Ebola virus
disease outbreak, a human-factors engineering approach to training
and ensuring appropriate donning and doffing decreased ambiguity,
explored failure modes, and enhanced teamwork to improve compliance with PPE guidance.57 Thus, other behavioral, adaptive, cultural,
systemic or other factors may play a role in adherence to best-practice
PPE use. Studies that utilize methods from healthcare epidemiology,
infection prevention, human factors engineering, and medical sociology are needed to identify and mitigate (or enhance) sociobehavioral,
adaptive, contextual, and human factors that impact appropriate PPE
use. In the current pandemic, where mask-wearing has become politicized, understanding these factors may be even more essential.
Understanding how to improve appropriate PPE use, through
understanding the socio-behavioral, adaptive, and contextual reasons for not following appropriate PPE guidance, as well as human
factors associated with appropriate PPE use, could improve PPE
adherence among HCP. Finally, PPE use has been complicated by
shortages, which resulted in institutions requiring healthcare providers to reuse single-use items such as N-95 masks. The shortage
of essential supplies can increase anxiety and fear in those who need
them; however, the impact of PPE shortages on future use of PPE is a
consideration that requires further investigation.58–60
6. Environmental contamination and disinfection
Surface contamination with SARS-CoV-2 has been frequently
described,61–74 but the role of environmental contamination with
SARS-CoV-2 in transmission in healthcare settings such as hospitals and nursing homes remains unclear. Three research domains
identified below (Supplementary Table 2 online) represent priority
areas with unanswered questions concerning environmental disinfection in healthcare settings:
Priority area 1: What are the risks associated with environmental
contamination with SARS-CoV-2 for HCP and patients?
Priority area 2: What are optimized methods for identifying environmental contamination with SARS-CoV-2?
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Priority area 3: Determine the optimal methods for disinfection of
healthcare environments.
Defining the risk associated with surface transmission is essential in assessing the potential benefit of decontamination and disinfection strategies. Although previously published studies
demonstrate potential for fomite transmission, additional studies
are needed to assess risk factors for both contamination and
infection associated with contact with contaminated surfaces. In
addition, these surface contamination studies were primarily
cross-sectional studies and case reports using PCR detection of
viral RNA on surfaces in COVID-19 units. Thus, while standardized methods have been proposed for evaluating surface contamination, evidence-based determination of optimal sampling
strategies will enhance future work.75 Subsequent studies should
include assessment of detection and correlation of findings with
infectivity. Viral culture may be more useful in determining risk
of infectivity, but there is inadequate infrastructure to broadly
expand study of environmental contamination using this
method.68 Enveloped viral surrogates including mammalian
viruses and bacteriophage should be integrated into disinfection
assessments. Establishing the infrastructure to define risk of surface contamination for other high-consequence pathogens is
needed for future pandemic preparedness.
If surface transmission of COVID-19 is described, then reducing this risk within healthcare settings is necessary to provide care
for vulnerable populations and to protect HCP. Implementation
challenges can be substantial, but leadership support appears helpful.
In a national study conducted in Thailand in 2014, Apisarnthanarak
et al76 found that good-to-excellent hospital administration support
for the infection control program was significantly associated with
greater adherence to implemented environmental control and disinfection protocols. Thus, identifying the incremental benefit of
enhanced disinfection strategies, such as ultraviolet germicidal irradiation, vaporized hydrogen peroxide, and others compared to commonly available disinfectants, will inform routine disinfection
practices.72,77 The methods for evaluating the impact of such disinfection strategies should focus on clinical outcomes and laboratory methods that predict infectivity.
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(Supplementary Table 3 online) represent priority areas with
unanswered questions concerning drug and medical supply
shortages:
Priority area 1: Define the extent of drug and medical supply chain
shortages caused, directly or indirectly, by the COVID-19
pandemic.
Priority area 2: Identify methods to disseminate best practices in
order to optimize patient care in the face of drug and medical
supply chain shortages, from local protocols to international
policies to help mitigate future shortages.
Priority area 3: Characterize clinical consequences of drug and
medical supply-chain shortages.
Recognizing disruption that can occur as a result of drug and
medical supply-chain disruption, legislation included in the
March 2020 “Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act” requires drug manufacturers to report the anticipated
duration and the problem leading to a shortage.80 However, studies
on the extent of these disruptions and effectiveness of such policies
during COVID-19 and after the pandemic is unknown.
Also unknown are the serious outcomes related to these shortages,
including worsening illness and premature death.87–89 In addition, little is known about how drug shortages impact clinicians who prescribe medications to treat critically ill patients. HCP reported
anxiety about their inability to provide competent and evidence-based
care during COVID-19.60 Minority populations and vulnerable populations may be disproportionately affected by these shortages. Drugs
and other supply shortages may pose ethical dilemmas when decisions must be made to treat one patient over another.90 The impact
of shared decision making and triage committees, which remove the
responsibility from the individual provider, on HCP mental health
and resiliency should be systematically evaluated.29,60,90
Addressing these research questions related to supply-chain
disruption and the impact of drug and medical supply shortages
will help preparations for future global emergencies and will
inform national and international policies aimed toward decreasing the impact of drug shortages on patient outcomes.

7. Drug and medical supply-chain shortages

8. Antimicrobial stewardship

The supply chain for drugs and medical supplies is global; most
drugs and medical supplies are made outside the United
States.78 Early in the pandemic, there were significant shortages
of PPE, ventilators, and materials needed for laboratory detection
of COVID-19.79 Drug shortages are situations in which patients are
unable to access clinically interchangeable versions of regulated
prescriptions due to supply limitations.78 Over the last decade,
the number of drug shortages has increased dramatically.80,81
COVID-19 revealed consequences: manufacturers closed, governments prohibited drug and supply export, and patients and organizations stockpiled drugs.29,82–84 Of drugs consumed in the United
States, 90% of raw active ingredients (active pharmaceutical ingredients [API]) are made in foreign facilities, 80% in China and
India).78,85 Thus, supply-chain shortages are a complex global issue
and can be influenced by geopolitical issues, trade, civil unrest,
weather, and pandemics.82,86 The full extent of the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic, however, on the drug and medical supply
chain is unknown. It is important to recognize and understand disruption in these supply chains to prepare for future pandemics and
other global emergencies. Three research domains identified below

COVID-19 caused a rapid shift in the delivery of health care,
including the suspension of elective procedures and transition of
in-person visits to virtual encounters.91,92 Changing health care
delivery may lead to an increase or decrease in antibiotic prescribing, depending on the setting and patient population. Three
research domains identified below (Supplementary Table 3 online)
represent priority areas with unanswered questions concerning
antimicrobial stewardship in healthcare settings:
Priority area 1: Identify the impact of changes in healthcare utilization and delivery on antibiotic prescribing.
Priority area 2: Define epidemiology and risk factors related to bacterial and fungal coinfections in patients with COVID-19.
Priority area 3: Develop and implement optimal antimicrobial
stewardship program (ASP) strategies to improve antimicrobial
use and patient outcomes while adapting to changing healthcare
delivery during COVID-19.
Although a decrease in the number of admitted patients may
lead to a reduction in overall antimicrobial use, several studies have
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suggested a large percentage of COVID-19 patients presumptively
receive antibiotics to treat the potential that the infection is bacterial or that a superimposed bacterial infection is leading to a greater
severity of COVID-19.93–95 Similarly, changes in the volume of
healthcare access (decreased hospitalizations and outpatient visits)
during the pandemic will limit longitudinal comparisons due to
altered denominators for typical use metrics, patient bed days of
care (for acute care), and in-person visits (for outpatient care).
Additionally, with routine pediatric care transitioning to predominantly telehealth visits, the pandemic’s impact on outpatient antibiotic prescribing practices for children remain unexamined
(Supplementary Table 5 online). Finally, the downstream impact
of changes in antimicrobial prescribing on antimicrobial resistance
and Clostridium difficile are unknown.
Typically viral respiratory infections have been associated with
an increased risk of bacterial or fungal coinfections, which substantially increases risks of morbidity and mortality.96–98 However, data
on coinfections in COVID-19 have been sparse and heterogeneous,
with estimates ranging from 3% to 30%.99–108 To inform antimicrobial treatment, we must understand risk factors and timing for the
development of coinfection. For example, the risk of coinfection
related to comorbidity (eg, immunosuppression) or exposure
(eg, hospitalization, ventilation, device-placement) is unknown.97
Furthermore, quantification of coinfection is limited by diagnostic
difficulties including (1) distinguishing colonization from infection; (2) improving diagnosis of coinfection versus alternative
causes of decompensation (eg, acute respiratory distress syndrome
from COVID-19); and (3) limited respiratory culture data due to
SARS-CoV-2 transmission concerns.109
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has drastically changed
the way that ASP teams interact with patients and other healthcare
providers.110,111 Although the focus of ASPs may have shifted during the pandemic, improving antimicrobial use and stemming the
tide of the development of antibiotic resistance remain at the
core.110,111 ASP teams are now ubiquitous in US hospitals,
but ensuring that all hospitals have adequate infectious disease
expertise on their teams may require novel approaches.112
Simultaneously, the responsibilities of ASPs have increased—
with many playing an active role in COVID-19 management,
such as guideline development or remdesivir allocation. 113,114
Virtual strategies, such as ‘tele-stewardship’ and nimble
regional or national ‘hotlines,’ particularly for small and rural
hospitals, need to be evaluated and implemented. Likewise,
although some nursing homes have established comprehensive
nursing home ASPs, a required condition of participation by the
US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), many
would benefit from additional support.95
9. Healthcare personnel safety and occupational safety
The COVID-19 pandemic has raised concerns about HCP safety.
Research is needed to identify strategies to protect HCP from
acquiring SARS-CoV-2 at work and to support HCP from physical,
psychological, social, and organizational challenges related to
the pandemic.58,59,76 Three research domains identified below
(Supplementary Table 4 online) represent priority areas with
unanswered questions concerning HCP and occupational safety:
Priority area 1: Define risks that increase HCP exposure to and
acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 and interventions that can mitigate
these risks.
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Priority area 2: Determine optimized strategies to protect HCP
emotional and psychological health.
Priority area 3: Determine impact of social and organizational
strategies to maintain the health and wellness of HCP.
Understanding the factors that increase HCP risk of acquiring
COVID-19 is essential to develop an evidence-based infection prevention program. These factors may include attributes of the
patients under the HCP’s care (eg, clinical symptoms, comorbid
conditions),aspects of the care delivered (eg, procedures performed, duration of contact, number of patients under their care
during a shift, preoperative screening), HCP practices (eg, PPE utilized, years of experience), and work site (eg, leadership support,
control over practice). In addition, understanding individual
HCP factors that increase the likelihood of an infected HCP developing more severe disease and adverse outcomes will help determine which HCP may need additional protections in place, such
as furlough, reassignment from the care of COVID-19 patients,
or ongoing testing at a set interval during hospitalization.
Research on costs and effectiveness of policies, such as preoperative
and on-admission screening, can inform practice, improve HCP
safety, enhance HCP confidence in safety processes, and reduce
staffing challenges.29
Controversy persists about determining what medical procedures may allow opportunistic airborne transmission of pathogens
traditionally considered to follow droplet transmission. Key considerations include the size of particles generated during specific
procedures, and the ability of the pathogen to survive in small particles, and the infectious dose for the pathogen (amount of virus
carried in small airborne particles sufficient to cause infection if
inhaled). These questions have important implications for air handling and PPE selection recommendations to minimize transmission risk in healthcare settings.
Identifying policies that support the social, emotional, and economic needs of HCP is critical to maintaining workforce resilience
and decreasing presenteeism, burnout, and turnover during the
protracted COVID-19 pandemic.60 Developing an evidence base
to inform these policies requires understanding how the pandemic
has affected HCP social, emotional, and physical health, finances,
ability to care for families, and decisions to come to work. A mixedmethods implementation science approach can inform local,
institutional, and national policies and practices to support HCP
resiliency, job security, ability to isolate or quarantine effectively,
and social support (eg, hazard and sick pay policies, housing
options, and consistent childcare).106
10. Return to work
Recommendations for return to work following COVID-19 infection are largely derived from experience with other communicable
diseases such as influenza and norovirus. COVID-19 has posed
specific challenges in timely return to work strategies due to minimal data on the true transmission dynamics and nature of exposure risks during HCP–patient or HCP–coworker interactions.
Little is known about which HCP roles or activities confer the highest risks of transmission and how this risk is modified by severity of
prior illness or presence of lingering symptoms upon return. Three
research domains identified below (Supplementary Table 4 online)
address the urgent priorities for research to facilitate timely worker
return while tempering the risks of premature return to work during active illness:115
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Priority area 1: Determine risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission by
returning HCPs to coworkers and patients, by HCP type and
setting.
Priority area 2: Determine the optimal criteria and modifications necessary for earliest safe return to work.
Priority area 3: Determine the sociocultural impact of and strategies for successful return-to-work for HCP.
As of November 2020, the US CDC recommends that HCP who
have had COVID-19 return at 10 days from initial symptom onset
(20 days if immunocompromised) if improved and fever-free for
24 hours without fever-reducing medications.116 During a pandemic, sick leave of this duration, even when asymptomatic, could
significantly impact healthcare system staffing. Many employers
are considering the use of test-based strategies to shorten the window for HCP to return to work. Shared anecdotal experiences suggest a broad range of approaches for return to work across
institutions and locations (eg, length of furloughs, strategies to
address persistently PCR-positive recovered workers, coworker
education, and acculturation to mitigate social stigma).
The true risk of virus transmission to coworkers or others from
asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic HCP to patients or other
coworkers remains largely unknown. Research is needed to assess
the relative importance of worker-related factors, such as viral
viability in minimally symptomatic or immunocompromised
HCP, effectiveness of PPE or physical barriers to mitigate transmission, and risk of acquisition among immunocompromised
coworkers and patients. HCP workflow, social culture, and nature
of coworker interactions may also affect the likelihood of transmission within the workplace. Finally, research addressing worker
reintegration and actions to assuage social stigmas (eg, educational
needs of workers, childcare) are vital to retaining a talented and
prepared workforce.90

Conclusion
The SHEA COVID-19 research agenda is critical and ambitious.
COVID-19 has exposed dangerous gaps in our understanding of
the epidemiology, transmission, and individual as well as public
health consequences of viral diseases. Global impacts on health,
the economy, and progress have been felt in every population
and country. The disease has disproportionately affected older
adults, especially those living in nursing homes or long-term care
facilities, racial minorities, and those with multiple comorbidities.
Supply shortages have affected the health and well-being of
HCP and have negatively affected care of those not infected
with COVID-19. A well-planned, collaborative, comprehensive
research agenda with careful, dedicated, and timely execution is
a critical element to address the most important questions to more
effectively limit outbreaks and pandemics. With the recognition
that pandemics do not respect boundaries or economies, close collaboration between various disciplines is crucial. Research initiatives and trust between industrialized and developing nations
are needed to address these critical questions in ways generalizable
around the globe, including attention to capacity building, technology transfer, training resources, and aligning surveillance and prevention activities. This research agenda is a snapshot in time
during the worst days of the COVID-19 pandemic and will certainly shift as the pandemic evolves and as vaccines and other
therapeutics become available. Nonetheless, several priorities outlined have relevance to future infectious disease outbreaks and
epidemics.
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This research agenda calls for translational studies from
laboratory-based basic science research to well-designed, largescale studies and health outcomes research. To undertake this
work, funding organizations must make COVID-19 research their
highest priority. We anticipate that the next decade will be crucial
in developing the next generation of epidemiologists, IPs, researchers, and leaders.
Supplementary material. To view supplementary material for this article,
please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/ice.2021.25
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